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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No.

910165

v.

i

KEELEY L. ROWE,

: Category No. 14

Defendant-Respondent. t
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1. Did the majority of the court of appeals erroneously
conclude that a violation of the nighttime search warrant
authorization provision, Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-5 (1990),
constitutes a constitutional violation such that the
"exclusionary rule" is applicable?

Did the majority of the court

of appeals erroneously conclude that the officers acted in "bad
faith" in executing the search warrant, in view of their
contemporaneous valid arrest of the home's owner?
The determination of whether a violation of a rule of
criminal procedure amounts to a constitutional violation
requiring the exclusion of evidence is a question of law and is

reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard.

State

v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
2.

Did the majority of the court of appeals

erroneously conclude that the mere status of being an "invited
guest" in a third-party's home "vests" the guest with a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence such that the
guest may challenge the validity of a search warrant for the
home?

Did the majority improperly adopt a "legitimately on the

premises" test for determining if a defendant's fourth amendment
rights are implicated in a search?
The decision to grant a motion to suppress and preclude
the introduction of evidence seized is a matter of law and
reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard; however,
the underlying factual determinations of the trial court should
be given deference and are reversed only if clearly erroneous.
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23,
1991); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
3.

Did the majority of the court of appeals

erroneously conclude that the state must prove a defendant's
abandonment of an expectation of privacy by "clear, unequivocal
and decisive evidence;" and did the majority erroneously apply a
subjective standard in evaluating whether abandonment occurred by
improperly requiring the state to prove that defendant did not
abandon the property "to avoid self-incrimination?"
This is a question of law, subject to the standard of

-2-

review delineated in paragraph 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
for a determination of this case are, in pertinent part:
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-5 (1990). Issuance of
warrant - Time and place arrests may be made.
A magistrate may issue a warrant for
arrest upon finding probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed
a public offense. If the offense charge is:
(1) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant
may be made at any time of the day or night.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990). Time for
service - Officer may request assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a
direction in the [search] warrant that it be
served in the daytime, unless the affidavits
or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to
believe a search is necessary in the night to
seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or
for other good reason; in which case he may
insert a direction that it be served any time
of the day or night. An officer may request
other persons to assist him in conducting the
search.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-10 (1990). Force used
in executing warrant - Notice of authority
prerequisite, when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure,
the officer executing the warrant may use
such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority
and purpose, there is no response or he is
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the

-3-

officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that
physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Keeley Laursen Rowe, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
and (b)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (R. 10). Prior to trial, defendant
moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant executed on a third-party's home in which she was present
(R. 28-31).

Consistent with local rule, the matter was

considered by the court without hearing, on the written memoranda
submitted by the parties, and denied (R. 32-41, 51-55, 60-61).
Subsequently, defendant waived her right to a jury; a bench trial
was held on March 21, 1989, in the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Washington County, Utah (R. 50, 62-65; T. 5). During trial,
defendant reasserted her motion to suppress the evidence (T. 7-8,
104-05).

The motion was again denied (T. 108). Defendant was

convicted as charged (R. 65; T. 181). Defendant was sentenced to
the statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years; but,
imprisonment was stayed and defendant was placed on probation (R.
80-84).
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a spilt
decision, reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial, concluding that (1) the search warrant
improperly authorized a nighttime search, (2) the remedy for a
-4-

defective nighttime search authorization was suppression, (3) the
officers' reliance on the magistrate's authorization for a
nighttime search was unreasonable, (4) defendant, as an "invited
guest" in a third-party's home, had an expectation of privacy in
the home sufficient to allow her to challenge the search warrant,
and (5) defendant had not abandoned an expectation of privacy in
her purse left in the home.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah

App.), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah July 3, 1991).
On April 9, 1991, the state timely filed a petition for
writ of certiorari in this Court.

On July 3, 1991, the petition

was granted.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The state accepts the statement of the facts contained
in the opinion of the court of appeals with the following
additions.
On October 6, 1989, a confidential informant told the
police that Stan Swickey, the individual whose home was
subsequently searched, had a large quantity of methamphetamine
and marijuana at his residence in Leeds, Utah, and had offered to
sell the informant "whatever he wanted" (R. 56-57; T. 12). Based
on this information and prior police monitored drug purchases
from Swickey, a felony arrest warrant for Swickey and a search
warrant for his residence were obtained on the night of October
7, 1989 (T. 9-12, 14). The search warrant authorized the
officers to execute it at night and without announcing their
presence (R. 57). Within hours, the officers entered the Swickey

-5-

home to arrest Mr. Swickey and execute the search warrant (T. 15,
18)Upon entering the home, the officers unexpectedly
encountered eight other individuals in the home for what appeared
to be a party (T. 16). Defendant was standing in the kitchen and
the others were seated around a table in the living room (T. 16,
21).

Drugs were in plain view in a cup on the living room table

(T. 26, 57-58, 126).*

The officers arrested Swickey pursuant to

the arrest warrant and informed him of the search warrant (T. 17,
22).
The remaining guests, including defendant, were told
that they were free to leave the premises (T. 30). Defendant
asked if she could get her shoes. An officer accompanied her to
a bedroom, where
[f]rom a pile of clothing next to the file
cabinet she — in which this purse was a part
of that pile, she removed her shoes in that
pile. In that pile there were some pants,
some women's temple garments, several other
items. She picked those up and her shoes up,
and [the officer] asked her, "Is that
everything of yours in this room? She said
that was, and exited the room and [the
officers] permitted her to leave.
(T. 30-31).
After defendant and the others had left, the officers
conducted a search of the home (T. 31, 44). Drugs were found
throughout the house, including a pile of methamphetamine on the

1

Edwin Davis was arrested for possession of the drugs in his
cup on the table. He was tried with defendant and convicted of the
lesser included offense of resorting (T. 181).

«6-

dresser in the room from which defendant had retrieved her shoes.
A vial of methamphetamine was found in the purse which had been
left on the floor. When subsequently questioned by the police,
defendant admitted that the purse and vial were hers.

She stated

that she had been "ripping offH Swickey during the party by
filling the vial from the supply of methamphetamine on the
dresser without Swickey's knowledge and without payment to him
(T. 35, 49).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The fundamental error of the Rowe majority is their
conclusion that the search and seizure in question implicated the
fourth amendment.

This error was predicated on the court of

appeals' misconstruction of the nature of the procedural rules
governing the execution of search warrants and the nature of the
remedy for their violation.

By equating a violation of the

nighttime search warrant authorization provision to a
constitutional violation, the majority improperly rejected this
Court's prior determinations that a violation of the procedural
rules governing the execution of search warrants does not
implicate constitutional rights such that the exclusionary rule
is applicable.

Further, the majority erred in concluding, under

the facts of this case, that the officers acted unreasonably in
relying on the magistrate's nighttime search authorization.
Based on its conclusion that any procedural violation
was of constitutional magnitude, the majority of the court of
appeals next considered and erroneously concluded that defendant,
-7-

as a social guest, had a sufficient expectation of privacy under
the fourth amendment in the third-party home so as to permit a
challenge to the validity of the search warrant.

By doing so,

the majority adopted a "legitimately on the premises" test for
determining whether any constitutionally protected interest of
defendant's had been infringed by the police action.

The

application of such a test for fourth amendment analysis is in
conflict with established law.
The majority of the court of appeals erroneously
concluded that, before a defendant may be found to have abandoned
a constitutionally protected interest in property, the state must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not
abandon the property to "avoid self-incrimination."

This

conclusion erroneously applies a subjective analysis to
abandonment and is contrary to the prevailing view.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of
appeals' holding which suppressed the evidence seized and
reversed defendant's conviction, and should reinstate and affirm
defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO
A PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF THE NIGHTTIME
SEARCH WARRANT PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANN. S
77-23-5 (1990).
In challenging the search warrant for the Swickey home,
defendant never raised an issue of the warrant's substantive
.-8-

statutory grounds of whether the affidavit in support of the
search warrant contained sufficient justification for a no-knock
entry, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990), and for a
nighttime search, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990).2
(See Constitutional Provisions and Statutes, supra at 4, for
complete text of statutory provisions.)

On appeal, the majority

of the Rowe panel upheld the lower court's determination that
sufficient justification existed for an unannounced entry, but
overruled the magistrate's conclusion that a nighttime search was
permissible.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.),

cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah July 3, 1991).3
Finding that the affidavit in question did not contain
a sufficient justification for the nighttime entry, the majority
then erroneously concluded that any violation of the statutory
provision was of constitutional magnitude. Jci. at 738-39. This

2

Defendant also claimed that the search warrant contained the
wrong date. Both the trial and appellate courts summarily
discounted this argument.
3

The appellate court concluded that the mere presence of
narcotics was insufficient justification for a nighttime search in
that the affidavit did not establish that the "contraband was
likely to be destroyed, concealed, damaged, or altered during the
night." Rowe, 806 P.2d at 734. For purposes of this review, the
state is not challenging the court's conclusion that there was
insufficient written factual justification for the nighttime entry.
However, § 77-23-5 does not require that the grounds stated for the
nighttime entry override the preference for a daytime entry.
Instead, the statute requires the issuing magistrate to be provided
with the officer's reason for wanting a nighttime entry so that the
magistrate may independently determine if the request constitutes
a "good reason" for the more intrusive entry. As noted by the
court of appeals, some recognized reasons are safety concerns, the
dangerousness of the offender, or the likely quick removal of the
evidence. Id. at 734 and n.5.

9

error is fundamental to the court's decision.

For by concluding

that the violation was of constitutional dimension, the majority
also erroneously considered defendant's expectation of privacy
under the fourth amendment.4

Both predicates are false.

The court of appeals' conclusion that noncompliance
with a statutory procedural provision requires suppression of the
evidence ignores Utah precedent and is in conflict with federal
law.

In State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366# 1369 (Utah 1987), this

Court concluded that despite an officer clearly acting outside of
his statutory geographical authority in an undercover purchase of
narcotics, suppression of the evidence obtained would be "a
remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained to the end of
obtaining justice while preserving individual liberties
unimpaired."

This holding was based on a recognition that

[o]nly a 'fundamental' violation of a
rule of criminal procedure requires automatic
suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental'
only where it, in effect, renders the search
unconstitutional under traditional fourth
A

The validity of the majority's conclusion that defendant had
an expectation of privacy in the Swickey home sufficient to
challenge the manner of entry will be discussed in Point II of this
brief.
However, the majority also implicitly assumed that
defendant would have standing to challenge the manner of entry even
if viewed as only a procedural violation.
This assumption is
incorrect.
Under traditional standing concepts, a movant must
establish a "causal relationship alleged between the injury to
[the party], the governmental actions and the relief requested."
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983).
(See also
footnote 7, infra at 19, for discussion of analytical differences
between traditional standing and a fourth amendment expectation of
privacy.) But, even if it is assumed that defendant has standing
to challenge the search on the procedural ground that § 77-23-5 was
violated, as will be more fully discussed, defendant's interests
would not be affected by whether the search occurred in the day or
night.

10

only where it# in effect, renders the search
unconstitutional under traditional fourth
amendment standards. Where the alleged
violation . . . is not 'fundamental'
suppression is required only where:
(1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense
that the search might not have occurred or
would not have been so abrasive if the rule
had been followed, or (2) there is evidence
of intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision of the rule.
It is only where the violation also
implicated fundamental/ constitutional
concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has
substantially prejudiced the defendant that
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 1368-69 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490
A.2d 421 (1985)) (emphasis in original).

Accord United States v.

Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1988) (noncompliance
with nighttime authorization prerequisites does not automatically
require suppression of evidence); United States v. Searp, 586
F.2d 1117f

1125 (6th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 921

(1979) (violation of nighttime provision is procedural and does
not require suppression; cited with approval in Fixel): United
States v. Shelton, 742 F.Supp. 1491, 1502-03 (D. Wyo. 1990)
(violation of nighttime search provision is statutory and does
not require suppression; citing Fixel as being in accord).

See

also Allen v. State, 85 Md.App. 657, 584 A.2d 1279, 1286, cert.
denied, 323 Md. 1, 590 A.2d 158 (1991) (failure to comply with
statutory provisions governing questioning to proceed with patdown is procedural violation and does not require suppression);
State v. Ford, 801 P.2d. 754, 764-66 (Or. 1990) (failure to
comply with no-knock statutory provision was excusable and did
not violate the federal or state constitution); People v. Dvla,
-11-

536 N.Y.S.2d 799, 808-09, 142 A.D.2d 423 (N.Y. App. 3988)
(distinct trend is towards a recognition that violation of
procedural rule does not implicate fourth amendment rights and
therefore suppression is not appropriate); Commonwealth v. Mason.
507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421, 423-24 (1985) (suppression not
appropriate remedy for technical violations of procedural rules
governing the execution of search warrants); State v. Brock, 294
Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982) (suppression not required for
violation of nighttime search provisions); Commonwealth v. Musi,
486 Pa. 102, 404 A.2d 378, 384-85 (1979) (suppression not
required for violation of procedural rules governing execution
and return on search warrant).
Despite this case law, the court of appeals concluded
the § 77-23-5 was not ministerial or technical in nature because
it "established procedures for protection of substantive rights."
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738. While certainly the nighttime
authorization provision was "designed . . . to govern the conduct
of . . .officers" and encompasses "statutory conditions which
explicate fundamental purposes of the Fourth Amendment," this
does not mean that the statute is of constitutional stature.
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d at 1124, and cases cited above.
Instead, the clear intent of § 77-23-5 is simply
to ensure that the fact that a nighttime
search is contemplated by the police is
brought to the attention of a magistrate and
that he or she consciously decide whether
such a particularly abrasive intrusion is
called for in a given situation.
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d at 1121 (commenting on identical
-12-

federal rule).

For this reason,

it is important to differentiate between the
right to be free from unnecessary and
frightening intrusions by the State into our
homes in the middle of the night and the
procedures
which have been established to
protect that right.
Id. at 1122 (emphasis in original).

Accord United States v.

Schoenheit, 856 F.2d at 77 (the nighttime search authorization
rule and the fourth amendment are "not coextensive").

Thus, the

court's reliance on general comments that non-warrant nighttime
searches were abhorred under the common law or that a night
intrusion is one element in considering the reasonableness of a
search is misplaced.

See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738-39.

For here,

assuming arguendo that the police failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of § 77-23-5, "the search was
nevertheless 'reasonable,' in the constitutional sense, because
it was conducted pursuant to a valid state warrant, and met the
requirements of the fourth amendment."

United States v. Searp,

586 F.2d at 1122. Accord United States v. Schoenheit. 856 F.2d
at 77 (there is "no authority for concluding that a search is per
se unconstitutional simply because it was conducted" at night).
The purpose of the statutory search warrant entry
requirements is to minimize the invasion of privacy which is
being authorized by the issuance of the warrant and to protect
the safety of the persons and property involved.
756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988).

State v. Buck,

Here, the issue is not whether

Swickey's home could be searched, but simply when.
Contemporaneously with the issuance of the search warrant, the
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magistrate also issued a felony arrest warrant for Swickey, the
owner/occupant (T. 9-12, 14; R. 57). Since under Utah Code Ann.
S 77-7-5 (1990), a felony arrest warrant may be executed "at any
time of the day or night," the intrusive nighttime entry was
already statutorily permitted under the felony arrest warrant.
Under these facts, to forgo the nighttime search authorization
would have resulted in a greater invasion of privacy to the
resident of the home and target of the warrants.

The officers

could have proceeded to validly enter Swickey's home during the
night to arrest him, and then could have permissibly secured his
home until dawn when a non-nighttime search warrant could be
executed.

Such a delay would not have preserved any additional

constitutional rights or served any practical usefulness. Accord
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d at 702-03 (a violation of the no-kncck
provision does not require suppression where the violation does
"not contribute to the invasion of privacy").

Certainly as to

this defendant, whether the search was conducted
contemporaneously with the nighttime arrest or in the morning,
the facts would have remained the same.

Since she was not a

resident of the house, she would have been asked to leave the
home with the other guests once Swickey was arrested; and, she
would have had no right to re-enter the home and remove any
property from the premises prior to the search taking place in
the morning.

Accord United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d at 77

(to show prejudice, a defendant must establish that, absent the
nighttime entry, "the search would not have otherwise occurred or
-14-

would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed").
See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30 ("any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded").
The majority also erroneously concluded that the
officers in question had acted in "bad faith" in relying on the
magistrate's authorization and executing the search warrant at
night.

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738. The appellate court addressed the

issue because the trial court had concluded that even if a
violation had occurred, the officers had acted in good faith
under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), such that an
exception to the exclusionary rule would be applicable.

But the

issue is not whether a Leon-type good faith is applicable, as no
constitutional violation occurred.
and cases cited therein.

Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69,

Accord State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415,

419 (Utah 1991) (good faith exception is only applicable to
fourth amendment violations).

Thus, Judge Orme's appendix

discussion questioning the propriety of a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, Rowe, 806 P.2d at 740-43, is irrelevant to
any determination in this case.5
What has been considered under the procedural violation
analysis, discussed above, is whether the defendant has been
prejudiced by the nighttime search and whether the police acted

5

Despite the Rowe appendix, it is clear that the majority
opinion only considered the good faith exception under the federal
standard as no state constitutional issue of good faith was raised
or argued.
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in Mbad faith" by intentionally and deliberately disregarding the
statutory rule.

State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368; United States

v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d at 77; United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d
at 1125.

"Bad faith" has further been defined as acting with an

"intent to avoid the limitations of the fourth amendment," Searp,
586 F.2d at 1120, or as involving instances where the
"intolerable government conduct . . . is widespread and cannot
otherwise be controlled," Commonwealth v. Musi, 404 A.2d at 384.
Here, the only factual predicate for the court's conclusion that
the officers acted unreasonably was that police officers are
presumed to know the requirements for authorization of a night
search and so this officer should have been aware of deficiencies
in the affidavit.

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 738. But this presumption

must be tempered with the fact that, arguably, a justifiable
reason for a night search existed in that the officers were
already making a nighttime entry to arrest the owner/occupant of
the premises.6

While the affidavit in support of the search

warrant did not specifically contain this information, it is
reasonable to assume that any magistrate, given such facts, would
have authorized a contemporaneous search.

See United States v.

Searp, 586 F.2d at 1122 (a factor to be considered in evaluating
the extent of non-compliance with the nighttime authorization
provision is whether given the facts omitted, a reasonable
magistrate would have authorized the night search).
6

As such, any

The state is not claiming that this is the only basis upon
which the magistrate could have authorized the nighttime search
warrant.
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failure to provide written justification for the authorization
was "ministerial" and does not fall qualify as "outrageous"
police conduct.

Accord Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369; Searp, 586 F.2d

at 1122.
For these reasons, the majority opinion's conclusion
that a violation of the entry requirements for execution of a
search warrant is of constitutional magnitude and "mandates"
suppression is erroneous and should be reversed.

For even

assuming a violation occurred and that a remedy for this
defendant is appropriate,

that remedy should be limited to

"official sanctions, discipline, and/or civil and criminal
liability."

Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369.
POINT II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE STATUS OF INVITED GUEST IN A THIRD
PARTY HOME VESTS THE GUEST WITH A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE RESIDENCE SUCH
THAT THE GUEST HAS THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE
VALIDITY OF A SEARCH WARRANT FOR THE HOME.
Based on its conclusion that there was a violation of
the nighttime search authorization provision and that the
violation was of constitutional magnitude, the court of appeals
considered whether defendant had an expectation of privacy in the
Swickey home based on her status as a guest.

In concluding that

she did, the court ruled that defendant's fourth amendment rights
were violated by the night search of the Swickey home and the
subsequent seizure of her purse which she left in the residence
after the police arrested Swickey. Assuming this Court agrees
that a violation of the nighttime search authorization provision
-17-

constitutes a fourth amendment violation, the court of appeals'
conclusion that defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated
should be reviewed.
Because constitutional protections against unlawful
searches and seizures are "personal rights which . . . may not be
vicariously asserted," Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34
(1978) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)), "[t]he touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is
whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy.'"

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,

211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

Any inquiry into whether a

challenged search has violated the fourth amendment rights of a
criminal defendant must necessarily involve, therefore, a
determination of "whether the disputed search and seizure has
infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment
was designed to protect."

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. As part of

this substantive determinationf a court must inquire "first,
whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged
'injury in fact,' and, second, whether the proponent is asserting
his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim
for relief upon the rights of third parties." Id., at 139.
Beginning with Katz, the issue of whose fourth
amendment rights may be implicated shifted from a separate
analysis of traditional "standing" principles to the "substance
of the defendant's claim that he or she possessed a 'legitimate
-18-

expectation of privacy' in the area searched. "7 Rawlinas v,
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).

To establish a

constitutionally legitimate expectation of privacy, a defendant
must first exhibit "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, . . . the expectation [must] be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
(Harlan, J., concurring).

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361

Accord Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.

Therefore, as part of a defendant's substantive claim that fourth
amendment protections are at issue, a defendant must establish
that his legitimate expectation of privacy was invaded by the
challenged police conduct.

Rawlinas, 448 U.S. at 104; Rakas, 439

U.S. at 131 n.l.
At trial and on appeal, the state argued that defendant
lacked a sufficient constitutional privacy interest in the
Swickey residence so as to challenge the adequacy of the search

7

The Rowe court, as did the state in its initial briefing and
petition, utilized the term "standing" interchangeably with the
concept of "expectation of privacy."
This is analytically
improper.
Standing, in its traditional sense, involves a
procedural determination separate and apart from the substantive
claim. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798
(Utah 1986) ("[t]he doctrine of standing is intended to assure the
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring that
the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in the subject
matter of the dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal and
factual issues which must be resolved will be thoroughly
explored"). However, an expectation of privacy for purposes of
search and seizure law is a component part of the substantive
determination of whether fourth amendment rights were implicated by
a search. Rakas. 439 U.S. at 428. Accord State v. Schlosser. 774
P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) ("standing" is not a jurisdictional
issue but a "substantive doctrine that identifies those who may
assert rights against unlawful searches and seizures").
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warrant for the home.8

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735.

In a split

decision rejecting the state's position, a majority of the court
of appeals concluded:
[Defendant's status as an invited guest in
the home vested her with a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home and she
thereby gained sufficient standing to
challenge the validity of the search warrant
and the resulting search.
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736.

Despite the court's use of the accepted

terminology of "reasonable expectation of privacy," the
majority's opinion amounts to no more than an application of the
formerly rejected "legitimately on the premises" doctrine and is
in conflict with proper fourth amendment analysis. Minnesota v.
Olson, 110 S.Ct 1684, 1688 (1990) (to claim fourth amendment
8

Despite the clear pronouncements, cited above, that a
defendant has the burden of establishing his privacy interest,
several panels of the Utah Court of Appeals have imposed the
obligation on the state to affirmatively challenge a defendant's
"standing" at trial or be barred from raising the issue on appeal.
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733. See also State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
885-86 andn.8, cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1990); State
v. Tavlor, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. Sept. 12, 1991).
The court of appeals predicates its rulings on State v.
Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138-39, in which this Court concluded that
the state had waived any challenge to the defendant's "standing" to
contest the search by failing to raise the issue at trial or in the
state's appeal. However, the state would submit that Schlosser
stands for the unremarkable proposition that an appellant
may be
barred from raising new issues on appeal, but an appellee may raise
additional arguments as alternative grounds for affirming
a lower
court's decision.
This Court should clarify that the state is under no
obligation to give "notice" at the trial level that a defendant
will be put to his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation
of privacy . See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 885-86. Instead,
defendants must assume their burden of demonstrating that they have
an expectation of privacy in the place or object as part of their
overall substantive challenge to the constitutional validity of the
search or seizure.
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protections, a defendant must establish not merely that he is
legitimately on the premises but that he has a "legally
sufficient interest" in the premises searched); Rawlincrs, 448
U.S. at 105 ("'arcane' concepts of property law" are not
determinative of the legal right to claim fourth amendment
protection"); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 (rejecting the concept of
"legitimately on [the] premises. . . [as] too broad a gauge for
measurement of Fourth Amendment rights"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353
(rejecting traditional property rights in the invaded place as
determinative of fourth amendment implications).

(See also

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 145-46 nn. 13 and 14, for numerous criticisms
by commentators and inconsistent applications by courts of
"legitimately on the premises" test.)
Defendant did not produce any evidence that she had a
greater expectation of privacy in the home than any of the other
seven party guests present when the police entered the home (T.
30-31, 96-97, 105-107).

The court of appeals agreed that

defendant was simply an invited social guest in the home and that
there was no evidence that "would lead to the conclusion that she
intended, or might have been invited, to remain overnight on the
night of the search."

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735. But, the court

concluded that this status, alone, was sufficient to establish a
constitutional expectation of privacy in the entire home.

In so

ruling, the majority relied on Minnesota v. Olson and analyzed
only federal supreme court decisions interpreting fourth
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amendment rights.9
In Olson, the United States Supreme Court held that an
overnight guest had a sufficient expectation of privacy in his
host's home so as to require an arrest warrant to enter the
third-party home and arrest the guest.

110 S.Ct. at 1688. The

Supreme Court concluded that an overnight guest is "much more
than just legitimately on the premises." Id. at 1688.

Instead,

an objective expectation of privacy is associated with being
9

The state recognizes the at least two justices of this Court
have recently stated that federal case law on standing is not
binding precedent on state courts. State v. Thompson, 157 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6, 10 (Utah March 21, 1991) (Zimmerman, J., concurring,
joined by Durham, J.). This view is predicated on the differences
between federal constitution case and controversy application and
state constitution separation of powers analysis. See Utah Rest.
Ass'n. v. Davis Ctv. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985)
(standing of an association to bring a declaratory judgment action
on behalf of its members); Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716
P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986) (comparing "case and controversy"
language of federal constitution with separation of powers
provisions of Utah Constitution); Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768
P.2d 455, 456-57 (Utah 1989) (application of standing principles to
"overbreadth" statutory claim).
It has also been applied in
determining state search and seizure claims under article I, § 14
of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 46970 (Utah 1990) (determining on state constitutional grounds that a
warrant was required before a search of the interior of a vehicle
parked at a residence could occur); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d at
418 (determining on state constitutional grounds that defendants
had an expectation of privacy in bank records secured,
unconstitutionally, under the Utah Subpoena Powers Act).
Here, defendant never asserted a state constitutional
claim at trial. On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, no issue of
state constitutional law was raised or argued.
As such, the
majority in Rowe properly limited its opinion to an interpretation
of federal case law and fourth amendment analysis. Under fourth
amendment analysis, no separate procedural issue of standing
exists. Instead, the formerly distinct issue of standing merges
into and becomes "invariably intertwined" with "substantive Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence." Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 111-12.
For these reasons, this Court should limit its review to the issue
of the correctness of the court of appeals' interpretation and
application of federal law.
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permitted to reside overnight since "[w]e are at our most
vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own
safety or the security of our belongings."

Icl. at 1689.

Despite the limited holding of Olson, the majority of
the court of appeals broadly and erroneously interpreted the
opinion so as to confer fourth amendment protections on persons
who are simply consensually present in a home at the time of the
search.10

Significantly, the majority failed to cite any

support for this expansive interpretation.

Every other court

which has interpreted Olson, has required more than an invited
guest presence in the third-party home.

United States v. Davis,

932 F.2d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (a defendant who had previously

10

While the concurring opinion in Rowe disclaims that the main
opinion should be construed "so broadly as to guarantee every
person invited into a home the type of privacy protected by the
fourth amendment," 806 P.2d at 739, nothing in the main opinion
curtails this application. Indeed, the holding is explicit that
the mere status of being an invited guest is sufficient to create
an expectation of privacy in the home. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736.
While social guest status, per se, is insufficient for
constitutional purposes, the state does not contend that Olson
mandates that a guest stay overnight to gain an expectation of
privacy. Accord United States v. Davis. 932 F.2d 752, 757 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1991) I Olson does not modify Rakas and pre-existing law that
a person may have a "legally sufficient interest in a place other
than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from
unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place"); Davis v.
Florida, 582 So.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1991) (recognizing that Olson does
not preclude a non-overnight guest from establishing a valid
expectation of privacy but finds under the facts, insufficient
evidence of any constitutional interest). Rather, the totality of
the circumstances must be analyzed to determine if a defendant has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched aside
from his mere invited presence. Olson, 110 S.Ct. at 1688. Here,
the state contends that defendant failed to carry her burden to
establish sufficient facts supporting an expectation of privacy
and, therefore, the court of appeals had an insufficient factual
basis from which to legally conclude that such an interest existed.
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lived in an apartment, continued to pay part of its rent,
retained a key to the premises, had independent access to the
apartment, and continued to store personal items there, including
storing some items in a locked safe to assure privacy, had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment); Lewis v.
United States, 594 A.2d 542, 544 (D.C. App. 1991) (a party guest
who fell asleep on a bed for several hours was not an overnight
guest and did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
apartment); United States v. McNeal, 735 F.Supp. 738, 741-42
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (a defendant did not have "standing" to contest
his warrantless arrest in his lover's apartment despite his
possession of a key to the apartment, where no evidence was
presented that he was intending to spend that particular night
and he claimed he was only in the apartment ro use the phone);
State v, Cortis, 237 Neb- 97, 465 N.W.2d 132, 138-39 (1991) (the
boyfriend and codefendant of the owner of a home did not have
interest sufficient to challenge a search warrant for the home
since he was not a "current overnight guest at the time of the
police intrusion," even though he had spent rhe night at the home
on previous occasions); State v. Whitrock, 468 N.W.2d 696, 702-C5
(Wis. 1991) (under the totality of the circumstances! a defendant
who occasionally stayed overnight at a duplex failed to establish
sufficient other facts to support any constitutionally protected
interest in the duplex);

State v. Brosnan, 589 A*2d 1234, 1236-

37 (Conn. App. 1991) (an overnight guest who was sleeping on the
owner's bed when the police entered the apartment had a
-24-

reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment); Owens v.
State, 589 A.2d 59, 64 (Md. App. 1991), cert, pending,

A.2d

, (Md. 1991), (a defendant who had spent the night before in
an apartment, left his suitcase there but was not spending the
night at the time of the search, did not have an expectation of
privacy in the apartment); People v. Bass, 1991 WL 190380 (111.
App. Sept. 27, 1991) (transitory presence in premises does not
create an expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Ferretti, 395
Pa.Super. 629, 577 A.2d 1375, 1380 (1990) (a mere friend, guest
or visitor in a home does not have standing to contest a search
warrant for the home); Crisp v. State, 195 Ga.App. 786, 395
S.E.2d 47, 48 (1990) (mere presence in a hotel room when it is
searched is insufficient to establish any expectation of
privacy); People v. Harris, 797 P.2d 816, 817 (Colo. App. 1990)
(a social guest, as opposed to an overnight guest, does not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host's apartment).
See also United States v. Donnes, 752 F.Supp 411, 417 (D. Wyo.
1990) (a defendant who had lived in the searched home
continuously for several months, had left furniture and
belongings in it, and had padlocked the home when he left it
sometime prior to the search, had a reasonable expectation of
privacy to contest its search); People v. Murray, 565 N.Y.Supp.2d
212, 213 (N.Y. App. 1991) (a defendant had standing to challenge
his warrantless arrest in his girlfriend's apartment where he was
spending the night); Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.
App. 1991) (defendant who stayed frequently overnight at his

25

girlfriend's home and paid some of the utility bills had an
expectation of privacy in the home); People v. Olson. 198
Ill.App.3d 675, 144 111.Dec. 806, 556 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1990)
(a defendant who was sleeping in a bed in his underwear had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in another's hotel room); State
v. Carter. 22 Conn.App. 118, 576 A.2d 572, 574-75 (1990) (a
defendant who was "clearly more than a transient houseguest" had
standing to challenge the search of his host's apartment); State
v. Corpier, 793 S.W.2d 430, 436-37 (Mo. App. 1990) (a defendant
who spent three to four nights a week at a friend's apartment for
"liaisons with his girlfriend" was more than a casual guest or
visitor and so had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
apartment); State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406, 413 (S.D. 1990) (a
defendant had standing to challenge the search of his
girlfriend's trailer in which he was spending the night); State
v. Walker, 236 Neb. 155, 459 N.W.2d 527, 531 (1990) (a defendant
who was an overnight guest had standing to challenge a search of
the premises)•
In conflict with this consensus view, the Rowe opinion
states:
Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest
has . . . standing, but nothing in Olson
suggests that a social visit of a duration
less than overnight would deprive a guest of
standing. While an overnight stay may
connote a qualitatively greater expectation
of privacy than some social visits, given the
typical characteristics of overnight stays
such as showering, changing clothes, and the
use of toilet facilities, the distinction is
really more one of degree than of kind. For
example, the seclusion extended to a parent
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who pauses to feed or diaper an infant while
visiting friends implies a reasonable
expectation of privacy, although the visit
might be a short one, and certainly less than
an overnight stay. Visitors of comparatively
short duration may nap, change, use the
toilet, or dine without any expectation of
interference from the world at large. In

this case, defendant felt secure enough In
the home to remove her shoes, leave her purse
beyond her view, and roam to rooms other than
where her fellow guests were playing
cards.

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 735-36 (emphasis added).

This analysis fails

to consider the constitutionally required objective
reasonableness of any subjective expectation of privacy.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
The facts relied on by the majority do not establish
that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
Swickey's home at the time of the search.

The actions of having

one's shoes off, standing in the kitchen, and having one's purse
in another room are not uncommon for any individuals familiar
with each other in a home, especially when the apparent purpose
of the gathering was to casually gamble, drink and use drugs (T.
16).

Further, the court's conclusion that defendant left her

purse in the bedroom because she "felt secure" in the home is
inconsistent with the evidence.

By defendant's own admission,

she was using the purse to secrete the drugs which she was
stealing from her host throughout the evening (T. 35). By having
the purse in the bedroom, she could more easily accomplish her
illegal activities since the methamphetamine she was stealing was
located on the dresser in the bedroom (T. 35). A legitimate
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expectation of privacy cannot be justified by subjective hopes of
concealing illegal conduct.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143

n.12; State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah), cert, denied, Lee v.
Utah. 454 U.S. 1057 (1981).
The only distinction alluded to by the majority,
between defendant and the other party guests, is that defendant
and Swickey had an "intimate relationship" in the past "which may
have continued to the time" of the search.
735.

Rowe, 806 P.2d at

But, the fact that such a relationship may have existed at

some time remote from the search is not relevant to the inquiry
of whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
Swickey's home on the night in question.

"Any other conclusion

would result in an overnight guest's having a permanently
protected fourth amendment interest in a place he or she once
stayed, no matter how remote in time."

State v. Cortis, 465

N.W.2d at 139.
It is defendant who has the burden of establishing
facts supporting a claim that her personal rights were violated.
Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166, 1171
(Utah 1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984).
Mere speculative possibilities will not suffice.

State v.

Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (permissive use for
purposes of "standing"11 will not be inferred for the driver of
another's vehicle); State v. Iacono. 725 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah
11

See footnote 7, infra at 19, discussing the analytically
improper use of "standing" in determining substantive fourth
amendment law.
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1986) (son's "standing" not presumed from the fact that the
trailer searched was his mother's and his clothing was found
inside); State v. Grueber. 776 P.2d 70, 75 (Utah App.), cert.
denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989) (defendant's live-in relationship
with the owner of the vehicle and weapon searched and seized
insufficient to establish a constitutional right to challenge the
search); State v. DeAlo. 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(permissive use for the driver of a vehicle not inferred from the
owner's permission for the passenger to use the vehicle).

Here,

the facts simply established that defendant was an "invited
guest" who, along with seven other guests, was legitimately on
the premises at the time of the search. Without more, this
status is legally insufficient to establish a fourth amendment
interest.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT EVIDENCE OF ABANDONMENT MUST BE
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
AND ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD
BY REQUIRING THAT "ABANDONMENT IN THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT SENSE" COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED IF
THE STATE PROVED THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT
ABANDON THE PROPERTY TO "AVOID SELFINCRIMINATION. "
While a party guest would not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the host's home, a guest could retain a
reasonable privacy interest in the guest's personal possessions
in the home.

In the court of appeals, the state argued that any

legitimate expectation of privacy which defendant may have had in
her purse was abandoned by defendant disclaiming ownership of the
29

purse and leaving it on the floor in the bedroom when she left
the home prior to the police commencing their search.
In rejecting the state's argument, the majority
concluded that the state must prove that a defendant abandoned
any legitimate expectation of privacy by "clear, unequivocal and
decisive evidence."

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. While the issue is

one of first impression in Utah, the better and more consistent
standard of proof would be proof by "a preponderance of the
evidence."
Only a minority of jurisdictions have directly
articulated the standard of proof applicable to a determination
of abandonment.

The court of appeals relied on Friedman v.

United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 382
U.S. 946 (1965), which, without discussion, cites a "clear and
convincing" standard as appropriate.

However, Friedman would

appear to be inconsistent with the majority position that in
considering the admissibility of evidence, a "preponderance"
standard is applicable.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445

(1984) ("preponderance of the evidence" standard is applicable in
considering the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177
n.14 (1974) (in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to
search, the "controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings
should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of
the evidence").
But even if a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
-30-

were determined to be appropriate by this Court, the court of
appeals' conclusion that the state had failed to prove
abandonment would be erroneous.
The majority opinion relied on two false predicates in
reaching its conclusion.

First, the court concluded that

evidence in support of abandonment must be "measured from the
vantage point of the defendant, and not the police . . . [as]
[i]t is only the defendant's state of mind that counts," citing
in support Narain v. State, 79 Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161
n.4, cert, denied, 317 Md. 71, 562 A.2d 718 (1989).

Rowe, 806

P.2d at 736. If Narain truly stands for the proposition that
abandonment is solely a subjective determination,12 it is in
conflict with the overwhelmingly accepted view that
the test to be applied in determining whether
a person has abandoned property is an
objective one - the words used, the conduct
exhibited, and other objective facts such as
where and for what length of time the
property is relinquished and the condition of
the property.
O'Shaucrhnessv v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. App. 1982).
Accord United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); United States v. Kendall, 655
F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982);
12

The language quoted is dicta contained in a footnote
discussing the issue of the voluntariness of an abandonment
occurring in the context of prior illegal police conduct. Narain,
556 A.2d at 1161 n.4. Narain has not been cited or approved of by
any other court.
-31-

United States v. David, 756 F.Supp. 1385, 1390 n.l (D. Nev.
1991); United States v. Walker, 624 F.Supp. 99, 101 (D. Md.
1985).
While the majority opinion correctly stated that proof
of abandonment is a factual determination "inferred from 'words
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts,'" a consideration
of the court's second false predicate makes clear that the
majority erroneously applied a subjective standard in assessing
abandonment.

In concluding that the state failed to carry its

burden of proof, the court considered defendant's denial of
ownership of the purse and then stated:
That repudiation of interest in property
located in the bedroom is consistent with a
conclusion of abandonment. It is not,
however, inconsistent with a conclusion of a
mere disclaimer of interest to avoid selfincrimination .
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736-37. This creates an impossible standard to
meet as most fourth amendment abandonment occurs for the singular
reason that a defendant does not wish to incriminate himself by
retaining possession of contraband or instrumentalities of crime.
The proper and critical inquiry is not the subjective reason or
intent for the abandonment but "whether the person prejudiced by
the search . . . voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise
relinquished

his

interest

in the property

in question so that he

could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to it at the time of the search."

United States v.

McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in
original).
-32-

Further, the majority of the court of appeals' panel
factually erred in only considering defendant's disclaimer of
ownership of the purse.

Defendant did not simply deny that the

purse was hers, she physically left it on the floor knowing that
a search was to be conducted after she departed.

This

combination of "words spoken and acts done" clearly established
that defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in
her purse prior to the search commencing.

Again, the majority

cited no case law to support its contention that a disclaimer of
ownership combined with a relinquishment of physical control does
not constitute "abandonment in the fourth amendment sense."
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision and
affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
•.

Keeley Laursen ROWE, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 890396-CA*
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 8, 1991.
Defendant was convicted of possession
of controlled substance before the Washington County Court, Fifth District Court,
Robert T. Braithwaite, Circuit Court Judge,
sitting by special assignment, and she appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J.,
held that (1) information presented in supporting affidavit was sufficient to justify
inclusion of "no-knock" provision in search
warrant; (2) information presented in supporting affidavit was not sufficient to justify inclusion of nighttime search provision
in search warrant; (3) defendant had standing to challenge adequacy of warrant authorizing search of third party's home; (4)
evidence failed to establish that defendant
abandoned any standing she might have
had to challenge search of third party's
home; and (5) evidence gained during
search would be suppressed.
Reversed and remanded for new trial
Garff, J., concurred and issued an opinion.
Jackson, J., dissented.
1. Drugs and Narcotics *»189(3)
Magistrate had sufficient basis to issue "no-knock" warrant on basis of factual
information presented in supporting affidavit even though affidavit was sparse; it
was clear from affidavit that object of
search was drugs located in residence, and
magistrate could readily and properly infer
that drugs could be quickly destroyed if
notice was given. U.C.A.1953, 77-23-10.
2. Drugs and Narcotics *»189(2)
Affidavit lacked sufficient factual information to support nighttime search warrant for drugs in residence, where there

was nothing in affidavit supporting inclusion of nighttime service authority other
than preprinted language and information
received from confidential informant, and
there was nothing inherent in narcotics
search which would necessitate search at
night U.C.A.1953, 77-2S-5(l); U.CJL
1953, 77-54-11 (Repealed).
3. Criminal Law *»1031(1)
For State to assert on appeal that defendant had no standing to challenge adequacy of search warrant, State must raise
standing issue at trial. ILS.CJL Const
Amend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures *»164
Defendant had standing to challenge
adequacy of warrant authorizing search of
third party's home, where evidence indicated that defendant had intimate relationship with third party and had stayed over
night in home on several prior occasions,
and defendant felt secure enough in home
to remove her shoes, leave her purse beyond her view, and roam to rooms other
than where her fellow guests were playing
cards, even though there was no evidence
that defendant intended to remain overnight on night of search. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 4.
5. Searches and Seizures e»164
Evidence failed to establish that defendant abandoned any standing she might
have had to challenge search of third party's home which resulted in seizure of her
purse, even though police officer asked defendant if anything else belonged to her
and she stated that she had retrieved
everything in bedroom that was hers; defendant's statement was not inconsistent
with conclusion of mere disclaimer of inter
est to avoid self-incrimination. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
6. Criminal Law <s=>394.4(8)
Items seized during search of home
pursuant to invalid warrant could not be
excepted from exclusionary rule based on
officer's good faith reliance on deficient
warrant, where although warrant allowed
nighttime search, there was nothing in affidavit that would offer any basis to magi*-
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irate for finding of probable cause to allow
nighttime search, and same officer prepared affidavit, secured warrant, and executed search, thus he had personal knowledge of affidavit's contents. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures *»101, 141
Mere ministerial and technical errors
in preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without more, invalidate
warrant UJ3.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
8. Criminal Law *»394.4(1)
Where statute dealing with searches
establishes procedures for protection of
substantive rights, violation of statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial
in nature and suppression of evidence
gained from challenged search is appropriate remedy. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
». Criminal Law *»394.4(8)
Evidence gained during search conducted pursuant to invalid warrant would
be suppressed; warrant authorized nighttime search when there was nothing in
affidavit that would offer basis for finding
of probable cause to allow nighttime
search. U.OA.1953, 77-23-5; U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
Shelden R. Carter (argued), Harris, Carter & Harrison, Provo, for defendant and
appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Christine
F. Soltis (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME,

JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals her conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. { 58-37-8(2XaXi), (bXii) (1389). We
reverse.
1* While the date on the search warrant and
supporting affidavit is October 8, 1988, it is
clear from trial testimony that this was an er-

FACTS
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant
was issued and executed which authorized
police to search for narcotics in the residence of Stan Swickey in Leeds, Utah. The
warrant contained provisions which allowed
police to enter "day or night," and to effect
the search without notice, Le., on a "noknock" basis. The warrant was issued
based on information in the officer's supporting affidavit that a confidential informant had been contacted by Swickey, who
told the informant that he, Swickey, had
picked up a quantity of methamphetamine
and marijuana that was being stored at his
home in Leeds. The affidavit in support of
the warrant contained preprinted language
which stated that the affiant reasonably
believed that the property sought could be
easily destroyed or hidden or that harm to
officers could result from notice. Following this language are two boxes that the
affiant can check, and which were checked,
to request nighttime and "no-knock" authority. No other factual information supports these requests.
The warrant was executed on a "noknock" basis on October 7, 1988,1 at approximately 11:30 p.m. When police entered Swickey's apartment, they found
eight people, in addition to Swickey, in the
home. Everyone except defendant was in
the living room playing cards around a
table. Defendant was in the kitchen. After securing the home, the officers had
defendant join the other people in the living
room, while Swickey was taken into the
kitchen and placed under arrest, pursuant
to an arrest warrant, and advised of the
search wan-ant Another individual was
arrested when the officers saw drugs nearby, in plain view. The remaining individuals,, including defendant, were told they
could leave the premises. Defendant did
not have her shoes, and asked if she could
go to the bedroom to retrieve them. An
officer accompanied her to the room, where
she took the shoes from a pile of items.
ror, and the date of issuance was actually October 7.
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The officer asked her if she had everything
that was hers from that room. Defendant
replied that she did.
After defendant left, the officers conducted a search of the home. Narcotics
were found throughout the house. A
purse was seized from the pile in the bedroom from which defendant had retrieved
her shoes. Inside the purse was a small
brown vial which contained methamphetamine. Also in the .purse were several
documents that revealed that the purse belonged to defendant
Police contacted defendant the next day
and advised her that they had a purse that
belonged to her. She came down to the
station and was arrested. After being advised of her Miranda rights, defendant
admitted that the purse and vial of drugs
were hers. She told police that she had
been "ripping off" drugs from Swickey.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress the vial and other contents seized
from her purse. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities. The state filed a memorandum
opposing defendant's motion to suppress,
and requested a ruling on defendant's motion. On March 17, 1989, the court issued
a written order denying defendant's motion.
Defendant waived her right to a jury
trial, and a bench trial commenced on
March 21, 1989. During the trial defendant again renewed her motion to suppress. The basis of her argument was that
the search warrant was defective since the
supporting affidavit did not support the
nighttime or "no-knock" authorization.
The state argued that "Mr. Swickey would
be the only one to have standing to object
to that," and also argued the merits of the
claim. The court denied the renewed mo:
tion. Defendant was convicted as charged.

sufficient factual information in the supporting affidavit to authorize a nighttime
search, 2) whether there was sufficient factual information in the supporting affidavit
to authorize a "no-knock" search, and 3)
whether the search was defective since the
warrant was dated subsequent to the
search.1
"NO-KNOCK" SEARCH
[1] Defendant argues there was insufficient factual information presented in the
supporting affidavit to justify the inclusion
of a "no-knock" provision in the search
warrant Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10
(1990) provides, in pertinent part, as fol' lows:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment or other
enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably
necessary to enter
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof,
under oath, that the object of the search
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given.

Defendant raises three issues on appeal,
all of which challenge the district court's
failure to suppress the items seized from
defendant's purse: 1) Whether there was

The affiant in this case requested a warrant to search for narcotics believed located in a residence, by checking a preprinted
provision on the affidavit form. A "noknock'1 warrant was requested based on
the affiant's statement that such narcotics
could be easily destroyed. Defendant argues that this statement alone is insufficient to justify issuance of a "no-knock"
warrant However, reading the affidavit
"in a common sense manner and as a
whole/' State v. Paul, 226 Neb. 432, 405
N.W.2d 608, 610 (1987) (quoting People v.
Mardian, 47 Cal.App.8d 16, 85, 121 CaL
Rptr. 269, 281 (1975)), we conclude that the

2. Defendant addresses the third contention in a
cursory, one paragraph argument She cites no
authority for her position that the erroneous
date invalidates the warrant, nor does she re-

spond to testimony given at trial that the date
the warrant was issued was actually October 7,
19S8. We therefore decline to address this is*
sue.

STATE v. ROWE

Utah 733

Cite at S06 ¥2d 730 (UuhApp. m i )

magistrate had sufficient basis to issue a
"no-knock" warrant
Although the affidavit is sparse, it is
clear that the object of the search was
drugs located in a residence. The small
amount of drugs ordinarily found in a residential setting can be easily and quickly
destroyed with even the briefest notice.
Therefore, issuance of a "no-knock" warrant is justified if the affidavit suggests
that a small, readily disposable, quantity of
drugs in a residence is £he object of the
search.1 The magistrate can readily and
properly infer that such drugs could be
quickly destroyed if notice is given. State
v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974); State
v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah CtApp.
1987). While a detailed and factually specific affidavit is commendable and may facilitate subsequent review by an appellate
court, it is not strictly necessary for the
officer to elaborate on the obvious in the
affidavit
NIGHTTIME SEARCH
[2] Defendant also argues that the supporting affidavit lacked sufficient factual
information to support a nighttime search.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) provides in pertinent part
The magistrate must insert a direction in
the warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to believe
a search is necessary in the night to seize
the property prior to it being concealed,
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for
other good reason; in which case he may
insert a direction that it be served any
time of the day or night
Previous Utah case law on this issue construed a different code provision which required that a warrant be served in the
daytime "unless the affidavits are positive
that the property is on the person or in the
place to searched/9 Utah Code Ann.
177-54-11 (1953). See, e.g., State v.
a» A more particularized showing may well be
required if, for example, a large quantity of
drugs Is sought. In such cases, as where the

Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846,
848-49(1972). No Utah cases are drawn to
our attention which have addressed the
present code provision.
The showing required by the present
statute focuses not upon a positive showing
that the property is at the place to be
searched, but upon whether there are special circumstances which would justify a
search at night The statute does not specify how elaborate or detailed this showing
must be, but merely requires that the "affidavits or oral testimony" must support a
"reasonable cause" determination that a
nighttime search is necessary. The precise
quantum of information which would support this determination is not defined in the
statute or in Utah case law and, as has
been observed elsewhere, it is difficult "to
anticipate all of the numerous factors that
may justify the authorization of a nighttime search." People v. Kimble, 44 Cal.8d
480, 749 P.2d 803, 810, 244 CaLRptr. 148,
155, cert denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct
188, 102 LEd.2d 157 (1988). Nonetheless,
the statute clearly requires a particularized
showing either that 1) a search is required
in the night because the property is on the
verge of being "concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered/' or 2) "for other good
reason." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1)
(1990).
Defendant argues that this particularized
showing was not made in this case. We
agree. Nothing in the supporting affidavit
supported the inclusion of the nighttime
service authority other than the preprinted
language referred to above and the information received from the confidential informant Contrary to our view that little
more is required to justify a "no-knock"
warrant than that the search is for narcotics at a residence, we see nothing inherent
in a narcotics search which would necessitate a search at night, even though circumstances can easily be imagined which would
suggest the propriety of such a search
affiant has information of the on-going cultivation or manufacture of drugs, the exigency of
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being made at night 4
In interpreting a similar statutory provision which allows a magistrate to authorize
a nighttime search upon a showing of
"good cause/' one appellate court observed:
(1) A magistrate cannot make a neutral
and independent determination of whether authorization of nighttime service is
necessary when faced with only conclusory and ambiguous allegations in the affidavit; and (2) an affiant's averment that
in his experience (generally) particular
types of contraband are easily disposed
of does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient showing for the necessity of a
nighttime search: a particular and specific reason for nighttime service must be
set forth.
People v. Mardian, 47 Cal.App.3d 16, 84,
121 CaLRptr. 269, 281 (1975).
In Mardian, the court held that the magistrate had "good cause1' to issue a nighttime search warrant based on information
provided in the affidavit that the contraband was in the process of being removed
from the premises, and that the occupants
would be able to remove the remainder of
the contraband before a daytime warrant
ready destructability, inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be present
4. For example, if the supporting affidavit made
a particularized showing that drugs were likely
to be sold or consumed over the course of the
night and evidence thereby lost, or that the
supply was likely to be imminently moved en
masse to a different location during the night,
or that a safer search was likely at night because
the house was abustle with activity during the
day and no one but the occupant was likely to
be home at night, then the propriety of a nighttime search becomes manifest We caution that
a mere incantation of such circumstances will
not justify a nighttime search—the required factual showing is not one which is conducive, for
example, to preprinted language. Officers must
"state a reasonable cause to believe a [nighttime] search is necessary...." Utah Code Ann.
177-23-5(1990).
5. Though we find it unnecessary to define what
"other good reason" might encompass, but see
note 4, supra, clearly one reason why a nighttime search might be authorized is where a
nighttime search would increase the safety of
the officers executing the warrant or the safety
of the general public

could be served since the occupants would
be leaving at 6:00 a.m. Id. 121 CaLRptr. at
282. See also Kimble, 749 P.2d at 810,244
CaLRptr. at 155 (magistrate could infer
that persons who had recently stolen stereo
equipment would attempt to get rid of it
quickly, since the theft was tied to a double
homicide); State v. Paul, 225 Neb. 432,405
N.W.2d 608 (1987) (affiant's statement that
he smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside the residence in the
afternoon supported an inference that marijuana was being consumed and thus destroyed). See generally Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrant at
Nighttime, 26 A.LR.3d 951 (1969 & Supp.
1990), 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal
Procedure § 166 (13th ed. 1989); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(b) (2d ed
1987 & Supp.1990).
The affidavit in this case contained no
facts from which a magistrate could infer
that the contraband was likely to be destroyed, concealed, damaged, or altered
during the night Additionally, we find
nothing in the affidavit from which a magistrate could reasonably infer that there
was any "other good reason" to justify
issuance of a nighttime search warrant1
We therefore hold that it was error for the
Of course, ordinarily a nighttime search
would pose a heightened safety risk since people
may tend to overreact to an entry by force in
the dead of night. Darkness may exacerbate the
reaction or heighten the confusion inherent in a
search, especially one conducted on a "noknock" basis. Nonetheless, a specific showing
that the safety of the public or the officers will
be increased has been held a sufficient basis for
a search at night Set, e,g.t Kimble, 749 ?2d at
810, 244 CaLRptr. at 155 (magistrate could con*
elude that permitting police to expedite their
investigation was an exceptionally compelling
reason to allow a nighttime search where dangerous killer or killers were still at large). We
note that other courts have rejected less compelling kinds of "other good reason,1' such as because "appellant did not get home until '6.00 or
after* and that appellant was not always present
at his house,* People v. Watson, 75 Cal.App.3d
592. 595,142 CaLRptr. 245,246 (1977); because
the officer applying for the warrant "was on
duty at night," Wiggin v. State, 755 ?2d 115,
116-17 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); and because Tt
[was] unknown when the person described (in
the affidavit] will be at the premises." State v.
Uen, 265 N.WJd 833, 840 (Minn. 1978).
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magistrate to authorize a nighttime search
based on the facts in the affidavit presented to him.
STANDING, ABANDONMENT, "GOOD
FAITH," AND SUPPRESSION
The state argues that any inadequacy in
the warrant is immaterial since 1) defendant has no standing to challenge the adequacy of the warrant to search Swickey's
apartment since she was only a guest in
the apartment; 2) any expectation of privacy she had in the contents of her purse was
abandoned when she told the officer she
had everything that was hers when she
departed Swickey's bedroom, leaving the
purse behind; 8) any technical defects in
the warrant were overcome by the officer's
good faith reliance on the warrant in conducting the search; and 4) any failure of
the warrant to satisfy merely statutory
requirements does not necessitate the suppression of evidence, as would be the case
where constitutional requirements are offended.
A. Standing
[3] In her reply brief, defendant claims
the state did not raise standing at trial
While we reaffirm that such a failure
would be fatal to the state's position, see
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 88&-86 &
n. 8 (Utah CtApp.1990), defendant's claim
is not borne out by the record. As indicated above, the prosecutor specifically argued that "Mr. Swickey would be the only
one to have standing to object to [the nighttime and 'no-knock' provisions of the warlint]."
[4] Since the contention was adequately
raised at trial, we now address the state's
standing argument The state argues that
defendant has no standing to challenge the
adequacy of a warrant authorizing the
search of a third-party's home since she
was only a party guest in the home. We
disagree.
Since the decision in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct 507, 19
LEd.2d 576 (1967), ft has been the law
that "capacity to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment depends . . .

upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143, 99 S.Ct 421, 430, 58 LEd.2d
887 (1978). A subjective expectation of
privacy is legitimate if it is ['lone that
society is prepared to recognize as *reasonabler "] id. at 14&-144 n. 12,99 S.Ct
at 430 n. 12, quoting Katz, supra, at 361,
88 S.Ct at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Minnesota v. Olson, — U.S.
, 110
S.Ct 1684, 1687, 109 LEd.2d 85 (1990).
The state's position that defendant failed to
establish standing based on the nature of
her presence in Swickey's home is arguable, but not compelling.
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded
"that Olson's status as an overnight guest
is alone enough to show that he had an
expectation of privacy in the home that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. 110 S.Ct at 1688. In this case,
the evidence did not establish that defendant was an overnight guest in Swickey's
home on the night of the search. There is,
however, uncontroverted evidence that defendant had an intimate relationship with
Swickey, which may have continued to the
time of the incident giving rise to this case,
and had stayed overnight in the home on
several prior occasions. However, the
record lacks facts which would lead to the
conclusion that she intended, or might have
been invited, to remain overnight on the
night of the search.
But as we read Olson, there is no talismanic significance, in determining standing, to the length of time a social guest is
in the home. Olson squarely holds that an
overnight guest has such standing, but
nothing in Olson suggests that a social
visit of a duration less than overnight
would deprive a guest of standing. While
an overnight stay may connote a qualitatively greater expectation of privacy than
some social visits, given the typical characteristics of overnight stays such as showering, changing clothes, and the use of toilet
facilities, the distinction is really more one
of degree than of kind. For example, the
seclusion extended to a parent who pauses
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to feed or diaper an infant while visiting
friends implies a reasonable expectation of
privacy, although the visit might be a short
one, and certainly less than an overnight
stay. Visitors of comparatively short duration may nap, change, use the toilet, or dine
without any expectation of interference
from the world at large. In this case,
defendant felt secure enough in the home
to remove her shoes, leave her purse beyond her view, and roam to rooms other
than where her fellow guests were playing
cards. Eschewing an analysis based on
free access and right to exclude others, the
Olson Court focused on the social tradition
that
hosts will more likely than not respect
the privacy interests of their guests, who
are entitled to a legitimate expectation of
privacy despite the fact that they have
no legal interest in the premises and do
not have the legal authority to determine
who nay or may not enter the household.
Id at 1689.
A standing challenge in the search and
seizure context is resolved by a determination of "whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
106, 100 S.Ct 2556, 2562, 65 LEd.2d 633
(1980). We conclude that defendant's status as an invited guest in the home vested
her with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and she thereby gained
sufficient standing to challenge the validity
of the search warrant and the resulting
search.
B. Abandonment
[5] The state argues that even if defendant might otherwise have standing to
challenge the search warrant, she abandoned the purse, and thus abandoned any
standing she might otherwise have had to
challenge the search which resulted in seizure of her purse. We disagree.
"When individuals voluntarily abandon
property, they forfeit any expectation of
privacy in it that they might have had.11
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843,
845 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting United States
v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Or.),

cert denied, 464 U.S. 859,104 S.Ct 184,78
LEd.2d 163 (1983)). However, "abandonment must be distinguished from a mere
disclaimer of a property interest made to
the police prior to the search, which under
the better view does not defeat standing/'
United States v. Morales, 737 T2d 761,
763-44 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11-3, at 54849 (1978)).
Whether defendant had abandoned her
purse, under search and seizure analysis, is
primarily a factual question of intent to
voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from
"words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846
(quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d
174,176 (5th Cir.1973)). See also Gurgel v.
Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 200, 429 P.2d 47, 48
(1967) (abandonment ordinarily a question
for the factfinder to be determined from
the facts and circumstances). The burden
of proving abandonment falls on the state,
People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450,
259 CaLRptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be
shown by "dear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence." Friedman v. United States,
347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir.1965). See also
United States v. Boswell, 347 KM 270,
274 (D.C.1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State,
420 So.2d 377, 879 (Fla.DistaApp.1982).
It "is measured from the vantage point" of
the defendant, and not the police. Narain
v. State, 79 Md.App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158,
1161 n. 4 (1989). "It is only the [defendant's] state of mind that counts." Id.
Defendant was allowed to leave the par
ty along with Swickers other guests. She
was conducted to the bedroom to retrieve
her shoes and was given the opportunity to
claim any other property belonging to her.
When asked by the police officer if anything else belonged to her, she stated that
she had retrieved everything in the bedroom that was hers. That repudiation of
interest in property located in the bedroom
is consistent with a conclusion of abandonment It is not, however, inconsistent with
a conclusion of a mere disclaimer of interest to avoid self-incrimination. The state
failed to produce evidence which would de»
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velop this issue and perhaps meet its bur- exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring un7
den of proving abandonment under search lawful police conduct, does not bar eviand seizure analysis. Accordingly, aban- dence obtained by officers acting in good
1
donment in the Fourth Amendment sense faith reliance on a defective warrant Id.
But the Leon doctrine is not without limitawas not established by the state.9
tions. When the magistrate reviewing the
C. Good Faith
affidavit in support of the search warrant
[6] The state further claims the search is not presented with sufficient facts to
can be validated by the officer's good faith determine jprobable cause, the warrant canreliance on the deficient warrant United not be relied upon by searching officers.
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-23, 104 Id 468 Uii. at 915,104 S.Ct at 3417. We
S.Ct 3405, 3419-20, 82 LEA2d 677 (1984). have detencnined that there was nothing in
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the the affidavit in this case that would offer
6. It is not entirely clear that even If the state
had proven abandonment defendant would be
deprived of standing to challenge the seizure of
her purse. "Property abandoned as a direct
result of an unlawful intrusion into a person's
right to be free from governmental interference
cannot be lawfully seized." State v. Nichols, 563
So.2d 1283,1286-87 (La.CUpp.1990). See also
United States v. Roman, 849 F2d 920, 923 (5th
Cir.1988); United States v. ToWert, 692 F.2d
1041,1045 (6th Cir.1982), cert denied, 464 U.S.
933.104 S.CL 337. 78 L.Ed2d 306 (1983); State
* Jones, 553 Sold 928, 931 (La.CUpp.1989);
Naram v. State, 79 McUpp. 385, 556 A-2d 1158.
1160-61 (1989); State v. Huether, 453 N.WJd
778. 781-82 (NJM990); State v. Wkitaker, 58
WastUpp. 851.795 P.2d 182.183 (WaskCUpp.
1990). Under this view, even if defendant abandoned her purse, she still would have standing
since the abandonment was precipitated by an
unlawful search of the residence in which her
purse was located.
7. Many have questioned tne Leon Court's narrow interpretation of the exclusionary rule's
purpose. See, eg, United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 928-60, 104 S.O. 3430, 343CM5, 82
LEd2d 677 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting); id
at 960-80, 104 S.O. at 3445-56 (Stevens, J.
dissenting); State v. Novemhrino, 105 NJ. 95.
519 KM 820. 853-57 (1987); 1 W. LaFave,
Search * Seizure f U , at 46 n. 5 (1987) (citing
extensive critical authority); Wasserstrom 4
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold:
But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am.CrimJJlev. 85,
106-07(1984). See also State v. Mendoza, 748
PJd 181.185 It n. 2 (Utah 1987) (criticizing the
breadth of the language in Leon). The Leon
rationale, viewed from a historical perspective,
is treated at greater length in the Appendix to
this opinion.
1 We note that neither party addressed Utah's
exclusionary rule, premised on Article I. Section
14, of the Utah Constitution.. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460.472 (Utah 1990) ("exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article L section
14."). To date, neither the Utah Supreme Court
nor this court has held that a parallel doctrine

to the Lean exception would apply in the context of Utah's exclusionary rule. See State v.
Mendoza, 74* ?2d 181, 187 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (Court has not yet considered Leon-type exception under Article I Section 14, of the Utah Constitution). See also
State v. Thompson, 751 ?2d 805, 809 (Utah
CtApp.1988) (concluding in dicta that Mendoza
did not invalidate applicability of Leon). Many
state court* have determined that exclusionary
rules existing by virtue of state constitutional
provisions are not subject to a Leon-type "good
faith" exception. See, e-g., State v. Marsala, 216
Conn. 150, 579 kid 58, 68 (1990); People v.
Sundling 153 MichJtpp. 277, 395 N.W^d 308,
315 (1986), appeal denied, 428 Mich. 887 (1987);
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553
(1988); State v. Novemhrino, 105 NJ. 95, 519
k2d 820, S57 (1987); People v. Bieelow, 66
N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37, 4S8
N.&2d 451, 457-58 (1985). At least one court
has construed a statutory exclusionary rule to
reject the ijeon exception. See, 04, Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 a. 5, 476
N.E2d 548. 554 n. 5 (1985).
Notwithstanding any dicta to the contrary in
our decision in State v. Thompson, 751 ?2d 805,
809 (Utah CtApp.1988), it is far from dear
whether the Leon exception has any vitality under a state law analysis, especially since the
basis and scope of our state exclusionary rule is
somewhat unsettled. See State v. Larocco, 794
T2d 460, 472-73 (Utah 1990). There may well
be sound nsasons for state court interpretation
at variance with the federal search and seizure
rules. See generally, Durham, Employing the
Utah Constitution, 2 Utah BJ. 25 (Nov. 1989);
State v. Larocco, 794 f 2d 460 (Utah 1990);
State v. Wests, 750 ?2d 1219, 1221 n. S (Utah
1988). See also State v. Larocco, 742 ?2d 99,
104-05 (Utah CtApp.1987) (Billings, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[sjtate courts responding
to the coniFusing and restrictive new federal
interpretations are relying on an analysis of
their own search and seizure provisions to expand constitutional protection beyond those
mandated by the fourth amendment, often directly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court precedent*).
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any basis to the magistrate for a finding of
probable cause to allow a nighttime search.
It appears from the record that the endorsement of the nighttime authorization
was done in impermissible "rubber stamp"
fashion. See Aguilar v. Texas, 878 UJ3.
108, 111, 84 S.Ct 1509. 1512, 12 LJkL2d
723 (1964).
The question of the officer's good faith
reliance is subject to de novo determination
by this court United States v. Freitas,
800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.1986). The
conduct of the officers executing the
search warrant must be objectively reasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct at
3419. Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous statutory directive to present
the magistrate with "reasonable cause to
believe a search is necessary in the night,"
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990), and
then claim that their very failure to do so is
objectively reasonable conduct on their
part See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20,104
S.Ct at 3419fn. 20 (objective standard requires reasonable knowledge of the law by
police officers); United States v. Freitas,
610 F^upp. 1560, 1572 (N.D.CaL1985) (police agency must train officers, who have
obligation to ensure that warrant comports
with constitutional law), affd, 800 R2d
1451 (9th Cir.1986). In this case, the same
officer prepared the affidavit, secured the
warrant, and executed the search.9 He had
personal knowledge of the affidavit's contents. This further persuades us that reliance on the warrant cannot be termed
"reasonable" and thus the Leon exception
does not apply in this case.

purse. We recognize that mere ministerial
and technical errors in the preparation or
execution of search warrants will not, without more, invalidate the warrant See, e.g.,
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah
1988) (violation of "knock-and-announce"
rule did not require suppression when no
one was at home at the time of the search
to respond to the knock). Cf. State t.
Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238,123M0
(1989) (suppression may be appropriate for
violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation).
[8] However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive
rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as
technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the
challenged search is the appropriate remedy. Awaya v. State, 5 HawApp. 547, 705
P.2d 54,59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744
P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 ?M
115, 117 (Okla.CrimJlpp.1988) (violation of
statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates
suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Washed 1,
621 P.2d 1256,1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement).
But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653
P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing
nighttime search without any showing of
reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had
considered and declined to enact specific
exclusionary rule for such circumstances).

D. Appropriate Remedy
[7] Having so concluded, we must now
turn our attention to whether the warrant's
issuance in violation of the nighttime
search requirements necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, namely the
drugs and other Hems found in defendant's

[9] The historical character of a nighttime search further persuades us that violation of the statute requires suppression.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
149, 45 S.Ct 280, 283-84, 69 LEA 543
(1925) (question of reasonableness of a
search must be viewed not only from the
particular facts, but also with an eye toward what was considered reasonable at

% We hasten to caution that the objective reasonableness of both the affiant officers and the
executing officers must be considered in any
review where the Leon doctrine is asserted.
Were a subterfuge to be employed to insulate
the affiant from actual service of the warrant in
order to support a claim of good faith reliance

by executing officers, we would not hesitate to
fashion an appropriate remedy. See Stele *
Buck 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J- concurring) (where officers purposeful'
ly serve a search warrant in order to avoid
giving notice of authority and purpose, court
will fashion a judicial remedy).
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the time of the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment). Searches of homes were
soundly condemned by the drafters of the
Bill of Rights and under English common
law.11 See United States ex rel Boyance
v. Myers, 898 F.2d 896, 897-98 (3d Cir.
1968). "Night-time search was the evil in
its most obnoxious form/' Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167,210,81 S.Ct 473,496, 5
LE&2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The propriety of executing a search
of an occupied dwelling at night is "sensitively related to the reasonableness" prong
of the Fourth Amendment United States
* Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir.
1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) ("entry into
an occupied dwelling in the middle of the
night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than entry executed during the daytime").
We hold that an unmitigated violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990), as is
present in this case, requires suppression
of all evidence gained in the search executed pursuant to the defective warrant11
CONCLUSION
The warrant was unlawful insofar as it
authorized a search at night Defendant
has standing to challenge that deficiency
by virtue of her status as a guest in the
home. The unlawful search cannot be
saved on "good faith" or abandonment
grounds. It follows that the evidence
found in defendant's purse should have
been suppressed. Her conviction is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial
10. In an often-quoted speech condemning general warrant*, Lord Chatham stated:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid
defiance to all forces of the Crown. It may be
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter, but the King
of England may not enter, all his forces dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement
1T. Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 611 (8th ed 1927). See also Appendix to
this opinion.
11. It may well be that section 77-25-5 merely
codifies that which is already required under

GARFF, Judge (concurring):
I concur in the main opinion but make
three further comments. First, one should
not construe the main opinion so broadly as
to guarantee every person invited into a
home the type of privacy protected by the
fourth amendment Any number of possibilities arise where one might be classified
as an "invited guest," but may not necessarily be entitled to a constitutional expectation of privacy. For example, a Fuller
Brush sales person, invited into a home to
demonstrate a product, may not have
standing to challenge an fliegal search warrant The emphasis in Olson, as here, is
that the circumstances that create a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home
must be such that society is prepared to
recognize them as reasonable. That determination is fact sensitive and the test need
not be overly complex. In Olson it was the
mere fact that defendant was an overnight
guest As an overnight guest, he had the
reasonable expectation that he and his possessions would not be disturbed by anyone,
and that when he was asleep and most
vulnerable, he would be safe from any unwarranted intrusion. Although here we
are not sure whether defendant was intended to be an overnight guest, circumstances
suggest that she was in a more privileged
position in the house than a casual, card
playing guest she had a close relationship
with the home owner, had been there on
other occasions, had free run of the house,
and felt comfortable enough to "make herself at home," in a literal sense.
The second point I would make is that
whenever a "canned/' or preprinted affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she
the Fourth Amendment See Gooding v. United
States, 416 US. 430, 464,94 S.O.17S0,1797,40
UBd.ld 250 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting)
(principle of requiring a showing of particularized need to conduct a nighttime search may
now be a "constitutional imperative"). See also
State v. Menke, 7S7 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah CtApp.
1990) (Utah Code Ann. f 77-7-15 codifies constitutional requirements for investigative stops).
But see Davis k Wallentine, A Mode! for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock
Stops in Utah 3 B.Y.UJ.Pub.L 357, 363 (1989)
(section 77-7-15 requirement is more strict than
the Fourth Amendment).
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has an affirmative responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying
the search warrant Condusory or ambiguous statements in the affidavit are insufficient This is particularly critical when the
warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into
a person's home.
Finally, while the analysis in the Appendix to our opinion is good food for thought
in a case where the state has argued the
applicability of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, in joining the court's
opinion I emphasize its narrow application,
and in no sense intimate any view on
whether the Leon exception does or does
not make good policy, much less on whether it should or not have any vitality under
our state constitution. Those questions are
reserved for another day.
JACKSON, J., dissents.
APPENDIX
The Leon Court, perhaps alarmed at society's prospects of failure in the so-called
"drug war/' premised the good faith exception on expediency. The Court concluded
that the exclusionary rule's sole purpose
was to deter police misconduct This view
minimizes the history of the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment and the development of
the exclusionary rule itself. Origins of the
Fourth Amendment are based not so much
upon law enforcement misconduct in executing warrantless searches, as in concerns
about the unreasonable issuance of general search warrants. The exclusionary rule
was born as a constitutional remedy for
violations of the Fourth Amendment generally, with no particular emphasis on police
behavior.
General Warrants
General warrants have their derivation in
thirteenth century universal authorizations
granted to innkeepers to search guests for
counterfeit currency. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, Part
One, 3 U.Rich.LRev. 278,283 (1969). With
the onset of the Age of Enlightenment and
accompanying reform movements, Eng-

land's threatened monarch* issued sweeping general warrants to search papers,
books, and documents for evidence of sedition and libel against the Crown. For nearly a century, members of the private printer's guild used these warrants to seize and
destroy the presses of printers who failed
to join their union. Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 ColumJLRev. 1365, 1369 (1983).
James I, Charles I, and Charles II, rulers
during the seventeenth century, instituted
unprecedented general warrants allowing
agents of the notorious Court of the Star
Chamber to search virtually at any time
and any place for seditious printed matter.
See Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S.
717, 726, 81 S.Ct 1708, 1713, 6 LEd.2d
1127 (1961). Tax collectors were granted
general warrants to enter castles and cottages, at any time without notice, to enforce the hearth tax. Not until a revolution which placed a reform king, William of
Orange, upon the throne, and a suit for
trespass by a member of Parliament, did
judicial review effectively limit the reach of
general warrants. Chief Justice Pratt
(Lord Camden) concluded in Wilkes v.
Wood, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763):
The defendants claimed a right, under
precedents, to force persons houses,
break open escrutores, seize their papers
& c upon a general warrant, where no
inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and where no offenders names
are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to falL [Such power]
is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject
Id. at 498. See also Entick v. Carrington,
95 Eng.Rep. 807 (1765). These cases were
known to the authors of the Fourth
Amendment, and Wilkes v. Wood is generally regarded to be the formative inspiration for the passage of the Fourth Amendment See Boyd v. United States, 116 U S
616, 631, 6 S.Ct 524, 533, 29 LEA 746
(1886).
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APPENDIX—Continued
Colonial Writs of Assistance
In the American colonies, particular exception was taken to the practice of granting writs of assistance to customs officers.
These writs, granted by King George II,
were valid for the King's lifetime and
granted unlimited power to the officers to
search at anyplace and any time without
the need for judicial review or subsequent
proceedings. Stewart, The Road to Mapp
% Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 CotanXJtev. 1365, 1370 (1983).
In 1760, King George II died and new
writs were required. The colonists sought
judicial relief from the new writs. James
Otis, a prominent attorney in the service of
the Crown whose position required him to
seek the writs from the Superior Court,
instead resigned his post and argued the
cause on behalf of sixty-three Boston citizens. N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 58-59 (1937,
Johns Hopkins Press; reprinted 1970, DaCapo Press). Years later, John Adams
claimed it was James Otis's fiery denunciation of general warrants in open court that
provided the spark for the American Revolution. Id

ance were condemned, Boyd involved a
subpoena for books and papers of merchants accused of unlawfully importing
glass. Id. at 621, 6 S.Ct at 527. The
Supreme Court concluded that because the
papers were sought for what was essentially a criminal process, forfeiture for customs duties, the Fourth Amendment applied. However, the Court did not order
suppression directly on Fourth Amendment
grounds. Rather, the Court reasoned that
the forced production of incriminatory papers and documents would violate the Fifth
Amendment and accordingly ordered suppression of the material obtained under the
subpoena.

Twenty-two years later, a unanimous
Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct 341, 58 LEd. 652 (1914),
which firmly established the exclusionary
rule as a fundamental principle of Fourth
Amendment law. Defendant Weeks had
been convicted of gambling, on the basis of
persona] papers which were unlawfully
seized. Before trial, Weeks moved for the
return of his illegally seized papers. The
Court held that the government was constitutionally bound to return the improperly
seized documents, which could not then be
subpoenaed by the prosecution, and reversed Weeks9 conviction: Id at 398, 34
S.Ct at 346. See also Schrock & Welsh,
Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary
This historical review suggests that the Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59
issuance of flawed warrants was of great- Minn.LRev. 251,295-308 (1974) (discussing
er concern to the drafters of the Fourth the impact of the Weeks decision).
Amendment than was the conduct of offiA few years later, the Court decided
cers charged with the duty to execute such Silverthome
Lumber Co. v. United
warrants. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 States, 251 U.S. 385,40 S.Ct 182, 64 L E d
U.S. 294, 316, 87 S.Ct 1642, 1655, 18 819 (1920), and Gouled v. United States,
LE<L2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) 255 U £ . 298, 41 S.Ct 261, 65 LEd. 647
(describing the text of the original draft of (1921). The eombined cases framed the
the Fourth Amendment).
exclusionary rule as barring any use whatsoever of improperly seized evidence.
The Exclusionary Rule
Writing for the Court in Silverthome, JusAn exclusionary rule was first applied in tice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: 'The
Boyd P. United States, 116 tLS. 616, 6 essence of a provision forbidding the acquiS.Ct 524,29 LEd. 746 (1886). It is instruc- sition of evidence in a certain way is that
tive that Boyd involved no issue of police not merely evidence so acquired shall not
tction or misconduct The challenge in be used before the Court but that it shall
Boyd was to a judicially-issued subpoena in not be used at all." 251 U.S. at 892, 40
a civil forfeiture case. Paralleling the cir- S.Ct at IK). Ultimately, and after further
cumstances under which the writs of assist- refinement, the Fourth Amendment exclu-
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APPENDIX-Continued
sionary rule was applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment
Mapp v. Ohio, 867 tLS. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct
1684, 1691, 6 LEd.2d 1081 (1961).
Against this background, it would seem
appropriate that courts considering the
scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be mindful of the process of review and issuance of the warrant, as well
as the lawfulness of the police officer's
execution thereof.

judge will simply evaluate the warrant ip>
plication for gross errors of law or something out of the ordinary, acting, in effect,
as a rubber stamp. See Goldstein, Tkt
Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.UXJtev. 1173,110
(1987); Wasserstrom & Mertens, The &
clusionary Rule an the Scaffold: Bui
Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am.Criml.Re?.
85,108-09 (1984) (citing statistical evidence
of lax warrant review standards). Much of
the exclusionary rule's vigor prior to Leon
was in requiring the magistrate to assiduously exercise his or her Fourth Amendment duty by carefully scrutinizing wu>
rant applications.

The Trouble with Leon
It is viewed from this historical perspective that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
Justice White's second assertion, if true,
897,104 S.Ct 3405, 82 LEd.2d 677 (1984),
calls into serious question the practical
represents such a qualitative change in the
need for the Leon exception to the excludevelopment of exclusionary rule jurispru- sionary rule. He gives high marks to
dence. Writing for the Court, Justice judges and magistrates, claiming that few
White offered three justifications for the issue warrants not firmly grounded in
conclusion that the exclusionary rule was probable cause. If indeed this is so, but
aimed at police misconduct and had no im- see id, the exclusionary rule would almost
pact on the judicial review of warrant appli- never be invoked in warrant-bud
cations. First, he declared that the exclu- searches, even without the Leon doctrine,
sionary rule was not designed to deter since the magistrate will have scrutinized
judges from error. Id at 916,104 S.Ct at the application and issued the warrant only
3417. "Second, there exists no evidence upon a detailed and well-supported showing
suggesting that judges and magistrates of probable cause. Thus, the societal costs
are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth of the exclusionary rule, a great concern
Amendment...." Id Finally, and ''most for the Leon Court, will be minuscule m
important,0 judges are neutral judicial offi- the context of cases where a warrant is
cers, not adjuncts to law enforcement ad- obtained.
ministration, and the exclusionary rule will
It may additionally be questioned whethhave no practical deterrent effect on them.
er the societal costs of the exclusionary
Id at 916-17, 104 S.Ct at 8417.
rule are as onerous as Justice White beThe first and third assertions seem at lieves them to be. The Leon Court reaodds with the fact that the exclusionary soned that the "marginal or nonexistent
rule, as first "designed" in Boyd, was ex- benefits produced by suppressing evidence
pressly created as a remedy for judicial . . . cannot justify the substantial costs of
error. Moreover, these assertions discount exclusion." 468 US. at 922, 104 S.Ct st
the historical concerns about the issuance 8420. But several scholars who have exof general warrants and writs of assist* amined Leon's "economic" conclusions reance. In the instant case, there is no alle- fute them as groundless in fact &eNsrt
gation of police misconduct in the warrant dulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionapplication process. The defect in the war- ary Rule Revisited, 1987 UilLLRev. 223,
rant might have been easily cured by care- 239 (exclusionary rule accounts for kss
ful questioning by an attentive magistrate. than two percent of case attrition); 1 W.
This is likely the more common scenario LaFave, Search A Seizure f 1.3 at 46 a. *
when a warrant's validity is challenged. (2d ed. 1987 A Supp.1990). Moreover,
See State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 while the societal coat of suppressing eviA.2d 58, 67 (1990). Often the reviewing dence may in some respects be more tangi-
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ble—H surely prompts an understandable
visceral reaction by many—the system's
use of illegally obtained evidence is not
without societal costs of its own. True, it
may be, that freeing a criminal because the
constable (or magistrate) erred is not an
entirely satisfactory state of affairs. But
b a society committed to the notion that
governmental action as well as citizen behavior is subject to the rule of law, it
should also be regarded as an unsatisfactory state of affairs to countenance the use
of evidence that should not have been uncovered, under our rules, to convict a citizen of some crim^
We believe the exclusionary rule may
well have, as a substantial purpose, the
objective of requiring careful judicial scrutiny of warrant applications. Simply put, it
is unlikely magistrates are any more
pleased to have their warrants "thrown
outT by reviewing courts than are the police to have their evidence "thrown out"
Such stimulation extends also to appellate
review. Rigorous appellate review of
search warrants ana the accompanying
benefit of defining search and seizure law
would be effectively precluded if Leon
were given wide rein, as the court would
have little occasion to proceed beyond an
inquiry into the trial court's finding of the
officer's good faith. Similarly, issuing
magistrates who are less than zealous in
their devotion to the Fourth Amendment
would have little motivation to look beyond
the face of the warrant, knowing that as
long as the warrant is facially proper, the
appellate court would not interfere in view
of the officer's good faith in executing a
facially proper warrant
Were an officer permitted to rely on a
facially valid warrant without more being
required of him or her, there would be no
incentive for advanced training which
would enable officers to better fulfill their
duty to uphold the constitutions of the
United States and of this state. Moreover,
the well-trained officer or prosecutor securing a warrant will be in a position to prevent the very harm which led to the good
faith exception. An officer who is motivat-
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ed to prepare a constitutionally adequate
warrant application will be less likely to
rush through a warrant application, and
will more carefully evaluate the sufficiency
of probable cause, so that the warrant will
withstand ultimate review and not merely
gain the signature of an issuing magistrate. Similarly, the prosecutors who must
argue the validity of warrants in court will
be circumspect in their assessment of the
sufficiency of probable cause when asked
for advice before a warrant application is
presented.
Fourth Amendment Conclusion
It may be persuasively argued that the
exclusionary rule serves purposes beyond
influencing the behavior of individual officers and officials. See, e.g., United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 975-80, 104 S.Ct
8430, 8453-56, 82 LEd.2d 677 (1984) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting justifications
for exclusionary rule not tempered with
"good faith" exception as also including
assurance of some remedy for violation of
constitutional rights and as placing judiciary beyond the "dirty business" of using
the fruits of unlawful searches to secure
convictions). But insofar as its purpose is
to influence behavior, the rule can serve to
promote discipline, thoroughness, and care
on the part of all actors in the process—police who secure warrants, prosecutors who
aid in that process, magistrates who issue
warranto, and police who execute warrants.
Any exception to the rule which focuses on
the rule's impact on only one of those
groups, officers who carry out searches, is
open to legitimate criticism.
As and when the appellate courts of this
state aire squarely confronted with the
question of whether the exclusionary rule
existing by virtue of Article I, Section 14,
of the Utah Constitution is subject to a
Leon-type "good faith" exception, a
healthy skepticism should permeate the
courts' consideration in view of the troublesome analysis in Lean.

